This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, Þnancial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to Þrms. This implies lower cost of external Þnance and better risk sharing between Þnanciers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of Þfty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model. JEL ClassiÞcation: D31, E44, O16
Introduction
A recent literature on law and Þnance has shown that investor protection plays a signiÞcant role in shaping the Þnancial structure of an economy, by affecting the relative weights of equity and debt in external Þnance (see Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005 and La Porta et al., 1997 and 2006, among others). In particular, it is argued that measures aimed at improving transparency and disclosure of information to the shareholders, and the enforcement of their rights, reduce the costs of outside-Þnance (see, for instance, Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002) and allow a better allocation of risk between Þnanciers and entrepreneurs (see Castro et al., 2004) . Several works have recognized the importance of Þnancial development for enhancing macroeconomic performance, mainly as measured by GDP growth and productivity (see, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001 for a survey). However, this growing literature has not recognized that the changes in the risk-taking behavior of investors and Þrms, associated with better shareholder protection, may also affect income inequality. This paper investigates the link between investor protection, risk sharing and income inequality, both theoretically and empirically. It proposes a simple model where investor protection promotes risk sharing between Þnanciers and entrepreneurs, thereby inducing more risk taking in the economy. Better insurance on individual earnings and wider risk taking, in turn, affect income inequality in opposite ways. The relationships predicted by the model are then confronted with the data.
To formalize these ideas, I construct a general equilibrium two-period overlapping generations model where agents are risk averse and heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial ability. When young, agents face a choice between a safe and a risky technology, and entrepreneurial ability affects the probability of success in the risky project. Starting up a Þrm requires an initial investment, so that entrepreneurs may have to borrow capital.
Financial contracts are designed to be optimal and incentive compatible, and may make risk sharing between investors and entrepreneurs possible to a certain degree. Financial markets are subject to imperfections arising from the non-observability of output to Þnanciers, but measures of investor protection can be adopted to amend these frictions.
In particular, by promoting transparency, investor protection makes it costly for entrepreneurs to misreport their cash ßow. 1 For instance, this cost can be thought of as the extra-compensation an advisory Þrm charges to certify a falsiÞed book or to design Þnancial operations to hide revenues from outside Þnanciers. Better guarantees generate more conÞdence among investors, thereby making them more willing to bear risk and insure the entrepreneurs through lending. In turn, investors can spread the individual risk by holding diversiÞed portfolios of risky activities. As a result, Þnancial systems with stronger investor protection provide entrepreneurs with higher degrees of risk sharing. Finally, I rule out wealth heterogeneity, so that all inequality is due to idiosyncratic factors (ability), Þnancial market conditions and income risk. Under these assumptions, better investor protection affects income inequality in three ways. (i) It improves risk sharing, thereby reducing income volatility for a given mass of agents operating the risky technology; (ii) it raises the share of the population choosing the risky option, and therefore being exposed to earning risk; and (iii) it increases the reward to ability. (i) tends to reduce inequality, while (ii) and (iii) raise it.
The main result of the paper is that income inequality is a hump-shaped function of investor protection and of the size of the market for Þnancial instruments that allow risk sharing (brießy, the market for risk sharing). Any improvement upon a low level of investor protection increases risk taking more than risk sharing, thereby driving inequality up. However, when investor protection is sufficiently high -and the market for risk sharing is big enough -any further improvement affects more risk sharing than risk taking, hence reduces income inequality.
This theoretical result is derived in terms of the size of the market for risk sharing, which cannot be measured directly. It can be argued, though, that entrepreneurs bear more risk the more leveraged they are, and thus the market for risk sharing is bigger, the higher the weight of equity relative to debt in the capital structure. Therefore, to evaluate empirically the predictions of the model, I proxy the size of the market for risk sharing with the ratio of stock market capitalization over total credit to the private sector. In particular, I provide evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries and a panel of Þfty countries, spanning from 1976 to 2000, that: (1) there is a hump-shaped relationship between income inequality and the ratio of stock market capitalization over total credit to the private sector; and (2) the latter grows with investor protection.
The contribution of this paper is related to three main strands of literature. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , as well as La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 Porta et al. ( , 1999 Porta et al. ( , 2006 , show that investor protection, and in general institutions aimed at contracting protection affect the Þnancial structure of an economy by promoting the development of stock markets, but have unclear effects on economic performance. None of these studies has considered income inequality.
Many papers (see Levine, 2005 for a survey) provide empirical evidence on the link between Þnancial development and macroeconomic performance in terms of GDP growth, investments and productivity. 2 It is also shown that whether Þnancial markets are more stock-or debt-based does not seem to matter for macroeconomic performance, but no attention was paid to the effects of Þnancial structure on income distribution.
Theoretical contributions by Aghion and Bolton (1997) , Banerjee and Newman (1993) , Galor and Zeira (1993) , Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) , and Piketty (1997) , among others, have proposed explanations for the relationship between Þnancial development, inequality and growth. In most of these models, income inequality originates from heterogeneity in the initial wealth distribution, paired with credit market frictions. As the poorest are subject to credit constraints, they are prevented from making efficient investments in the most productive activities. 3 Over time, capital accumulation determines the dynamics of wealth and income. I depart from this approach in two main respects. First, I shift the focus from Þnancial development, broadly deÞned as the overall availability of external Þnance to the private sector, to the development of the market for instruments that allow agents not only to raise external Þnance but also to share risks at the same time.
Second, I consider a different source of ex-ante heterogeneity (entrepreneurial ability), and propose a new mechanism translating differences in ability into income inequality that is independent of wealth accumulation. 4 In the present paper, heterogeneity in productivity, the extent of risk sharing and the size of the risky sector ultimately determine the income distribution.
There are, to my knowledge, only two empirical assessments of the relationship between Þnancial development and income inequality (Clarke et al., 2006 and Beck et al., 2006) .
As the theoretical works above, these papers are interested in the effects of overall external Þnance availability on income inequality, and both Þnd evidence of a negative relationship.
My contribution focuses explicitly on the impact of a particular form of external, risksharing, Þnance on income inequality. Therefore, instead of taking a general measure of Þnancial depth as a regressor for income inequality, I use the size of the stock market relative to total credit to the private sector, that seems well suited to account for the degree of risk sharing allowed by a Þnancial system. Not only are my empirical results consistent with the previous evidence on the negative effect of Þnancial depth on income inequality, but they also provide a novel contribution by emphasizing the opposite role of equity-like Þnance in raising inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its The model economy is populated by two-period overlapping generations of risk-averse agents. There is no population growth and the measure of each cohort is normalized to one. For simplicity, preferences are represented by the following utility function:
Second-period utility is discounted at the rate β ∈ (0, 1) . Figure 1 : Timing of the model At any time t, each young agent in ability group i is born with no wealth and ability π i ∈ [0, 1], drawn from distribution G (π). Each group has a density g(π) of individuals.
In the Þrst period, agents work as self-employed entrepreneurs producing an intermediate good, and allocate their income among consumption and savings, s(·). When old, they invest their savings and consume all the returns before dying. When investing, they can choose between safe loans, yielding a return r t+1 , and portfolios of risky assets. There are no bequests.
Intermediate goods sector
Two production processes are available to each young agent: a safe and a risky one. Both technologies require a Þxed unit investment. In line with empirical Þndings, I assume that the risky activity, if successful, has higher returns than the safe one and that the probability of success depends on the ability of the entrepreneur. 5 For simplicity, and without much loss of generality, I assume that ability only affects the probability of success and not the payoffs. 6 In particular, production is given by:
where B < A, ϕ ∈ (0, 1) and success is i.i.d. within each group. It follows that there is no aggregate risk and total production of group i equals g
depending on the technology, safe or risky, in use.
Final good sector
A homogeneous Þnal good Y , used for consumption and investment, is produced by com- 
where X t is the total amount of intermediate goods, with a unit price of χ t , K Y t is the amount of capital employed in the Þnal good sector and α ∈ (0, 1) is its share of production.
Y t is the numeraire.
Financial sector
Firms in both the Þnal and the intermediate good sectors need to borrow capital from the old in order to produce. Information about technology (A, B, ϕ, α), individual ability (π i ), and technological choice is public, but outside Þnanciers cannot observe the outcome of risky activities, x it .
The Þnancial contract is modeled as follows. Upon receiving capital, each Þrm commits to pay, after production, shares θ h t and θ l t of its cash ßow in case of success and failure, 5 See Schiller and Crewson (1997) , and Fairly and Robb (2003) for empirical studies on the determinants of entrepreneurial success, mainly among small Þrms. 6 Ability can be considered as playing a twofold role. It enhances the chance of succeeding in risky enterprises, as assumed in the model. But it may also raise productivity regardless of the riskiness of projects. Introducing this second effect into the model would not affect the results.
respectively. Final good producers and young entrepreneurs using the safe technology are not subject to any risk, nor information asymmetry, so that they will repay a Þxed amount for each unit of capital, corresponding to the safe interest rate, r t . The repayment schedule facing young risky entrepreneurs is different. Once production has occurred, unlucky entrepreneurs of type i can only return the promised amount θ l it x l it χ t . Successful entrepreneurs, instead, may misreport their realization of x it and pay θ l it x l it χ t , pretending to be in the bad state. However, I assume that measures of investor protection make misreporting costly. For every unit of hidden cash ßow, the entrepreneur incurs a cost p ∈ [0, 1]. Since both ability and technology are common knowledge, either the entire
or nothing is hidden, so that the payoff from misreporting is
Truth-telling is rational as long as its value is at least equal to that of misreporting. Therefore, the Þnancial contract © θ h it , θ l it ª must satisfy the incentive
where v [w t , r t+1 ] is the indirect utility of a young agent with a given income w t and facing an interest rate r t+1 when old.
Financial contracts are set to maximize the agents' expected indirect utility, V it , subject to the IC constraint and the outsiders' participation constraint. The latter requires that (atomistic) old agents be indifferent between lending to all Þrms of group-i, and lending to safe Þrms. 7 Thus, the payoffs from the risky technology are determined as the solution to the optimal Þnancial contract problem:
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
v
and the old's participation constraint: with certainty, so that the old face no uncertainty. 8 
Equilibrium
Firms in the Þnal good sector are perfectly competitive and maximize proÞts taking prices (r t , χ t ) as given. Each young agent from group i has perfect foresight and chooses how much to save, s (·), and the technology to use (safe or risky), to maximize her expected utility. Thus, each of them solves the following program:
where
Here, w it is realized income, i.e., Bχ t − r t in case the safe technology is chosen, otherwise
ϕAχ t in the good and bad state respectively. In other words, young entrepreneurs choose technology, given their individual ability π i , factor prices r t and χ t , and the optimal Þnancial contract {θ l it , θ h it } which solves (P 1). To state the mechanism of the model in the clearest way, I Þrst assume this to be a small open economy. 9 Both capital and intermediate goods are internationally traded, so that r t and χ t are exogenously given from the world markets, while the Þnal good Y is non traded. 10 Assuming that prices (r, χ and p) are constant, the economy is always in a steady-state and I can drop all the time indexes. It follows that aggregate domestic demand for the Þnal good is Y D = (1+ r)
Definition Given the interest rate r, the intermediate good price χ, and the misreporting cost p, the equilibrium for this small open economy is deÞned as the set of savings, technological choices and Þnancial contracts 1] , such that each agent in group i solves (P1) -(P2); and the factor employments {K Y , X} that maximize proÞts in the Þnal good sector.
For simplicity, I assume that ϕA < r χ < B < A. This implies that both safe and risky intermediate projects are run in equilibrium; and when investor protection is absent, nobody chooses the risky technology. 11 
Solution

Final good sector
ProÞt maximization by competitive Þrms in the Þnal good sector yields the following demand functions for capital and intermediates:
Young agents
Due to log-utility, the optimal saving function of each young agent is simply a constant fraction (1 + β) −1 of her earnings. To solve for the optimal occupational choice (P 2), an agent born in group i needs to know the payoffs from the risky technology. Therefore, I proceed backwards. First, I derive the optimal Þnancial contracts © θ h i , θ l i ª i∈[0,1] from (P 1), under both perfect and imperfect investor protection. Then, I characterize the occupational choice, {T i } i∈[0,1] , given the optimal payoffs. Finally, I show how the equilibrium is affected by investor protection.
Optimal Þnancial contract: efficient markets, p = 1
In this case, the payoff from hiding cash ßow equals earnings in the bad state, ¡ 1 − θ l i ¢ χx l i . This means that there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to misreport, so that investors can act as if they had perfect information about x i . Having a state-invariant income is the Þrst best for risk-averse entrepreneurs. Since outside Þnanciers behave as if they were riskneutral and perfectly informed, they are willing to provide insiders with full insurance, given that the expected return equals the safe rate. Analytically, the Þrst-order conditions for (P 1) subject to (P C) require:
where v 0 h and v 0 l are the derivatives of v
with re-spect to θ h i and θ l i , respectively. This means that (IC 0 ) holds with equality and
, earnings of entrepreneurs are state invariant: w h i = w l i ).
Optimal Þnancial contract: general case, 0 < p < 1
If investor protection is not perfect, state invariant earnings are not incentive compatible: entrepreneurs in the good state would be tempted to misreport x i and enjoy the higher utility given by earnings
Investors are aware of this and hence account for it when determining the repayments. In other words, both (IC 0 ) and (P C) must hold with equality, so that
The wedge between state-contingent earnings, i.e. the price for the temptation to misreport, is decreasing in investor protection. If the cost of hiding proÞts is high, temptation to misreport is low, as is its price in terms of distance from the Þrst best. The ratio between payoffs and ability is lower than in the efficient case, and increasing in p. This means that, by discouraging misbehavior, investor protection also fosters meritocracy. Expected earnings for entrepreneurs are the same as under perfect investor protection, but expected utility is lower, due to risk aversion. Notice that for p = 0, the optimal Þnancial contract implies state independent repayments, which leave the entire risk on the entrepreneur.
Technological choice
The solution to (P 2) features a threshold ability level π * such that the Risky technology is chosen by any agent with ability higher than π * . This property is formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique π * such that ∀π
is the solution to (P 1) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Investor protection and the equilibrium
Since the dividend payouts © θ h i , θ l i ª are functions of investor protection, also the threshold ability π * varies with p, as formalized in Lemma 2
Lemma 2
The threshold ability π * is a decreasing, convex function of investor protection p.
Notice that the risky technology is chosen only when some degree of risk sharing is attainable through the Þnancial contract. Thus, the measure of agents who become risky entrepreneurs represents the size of the market for risk sharing. Safe Þrms instead get started and operated regardless of the borrowing conditions in the Þnancial market. From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that the size of the market for risk sharing is a function of investor protection, as stated by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
The size of the market for risk sharing, M ≡ 1 − G (π * ), is increasing in investor protection, and concave for high p.
Corollary 1 DeÞne the size of the overall external Þnance as F ≡ K Y + 1. The size of the market for risk sharing as a ratio of the total external Þnance, M F is increasing in investor protection and concave for high p.
In the efficient case (p = 1), the value of producing with the risky technology is higher than that of running the safe project whenever [π i + (1 − π i ) ϕ] A ≥ B. Therefore, I can easily get a closed form solution for the threshold ability,
and verify that it lies in the support of π under the hypotheses that A > B and ϕA < B.
In the general case of imperfect investor protection (p < 1), the expression for the threshold ability is more complicated. However, payoffs are easily derived:
Henceforth, I denote the threshold abilities associated with p = 1 and 0 < p < 1 by π * p=1 and π * p<1 , respectively. For p = 1, perfect risk sharing is achieved through the optimal Þnancial contract, so that entrepreneurs act as if they were risk-neutral. They choose the risky technology as soon as their ability implies expected earnings equal to the safe ones, i.e. π i = π * p=1 . This means that their earnings are state invariant and exhibit no discontinuity at the threshold ability level. When 0 < p < 1, at π i = π * p<1 the expected productivity of the risky technology needs to be higher than the productivity of the safe technology, because entrepreneurs are risk averse and cannot be fully insured by investors. In the opposite extreme case of p = 1, income of young agents is described by the solid line. It is ßat for the less able, who run the safe project, and proportional to ability for the more talented, risky entrepreneurs. Due to perfect risk sharing, earnings are state invariant. If investor protection drops to 0 < p < 1 (dashed line), Þnancing a risky Þrm becomes more costly, thereby inducing the least able among risky entrepreneurs to shift to the safe sector. Graphically, (1) the market for risk sharing shrinks, i.e., the ßat portion of the earnings proÞle becomes longer. I deÞne this as the "market size" effect. (2) Proportionality between stochastic payoffs and ability becomes weaker due to higher incentives to misreport, and the wedge between state contingent earnings widens due to worse risk sharing. I call this, as illustrated by the ßatter slope and higher distance between w h ip<1 and w l ip<1 , the "insurance" effect. The extent of imperfect insurance is captured by the jump in expected earnings at π * p<1 . At any π i ≥ π * p<1 , the expected payoff from the risky technology is independent of p since, for a given interest rate, the old are indifferent between borrowers. However, even though expected earnings are invariant, welfare is higher under perfect investor protection because of risk aversion.
Evaluating income inequality
In this section, I derive the key implications of the model on the overall effect of investor protection on income inequality, through the development of the market for risk sharing.
To do so, I compute the variance of earnings,
dπ− r, and study how it varies with p. 12 If there is no investor protection, all agents choose the safe technology and thus, the variance is zero. If the cost of hiding cash ßow becomes any higher than zero (p=ε), some agents prefer the risky technology and get insured while raising funds, thereby driving the size of the market for risk sharing from zero to M (ε). By the "market size" effect, a share of the economy becomes subject to income risk (having state-contingent earnings), thereby raising the variance of income (analytically, positive terms fall under the integral).
Moreover, average earnings grow higher than Bχ, so that also the agents on the ßat portion in Figure 2 contribute to raising the variance.
As investor protection improves, the "market size" effect is paired with the "insurance" effect, that shrinks the wedge between state-contingent earnings and hence, tends to reduce the variance. Analytically, the "insurance" effect tends to reduce the term under integration. The extent of the "market size" effect is decreasing in investor protection, due to the concavity of M at high p. On the other hand, "insurance" becomes more effective, the larger is the mass of agents that beneÞt from it. This means that, when investor protection is weak (M is small), the market-size effect dominates because risk sharing applies to a small fraction of the economy. Therefore, inequality at Þrst increases with p (and with M).
When investor protection is perfect
As p falls any lower than 1 (p = 1− ε), the "market size" effect drives only few agents out of the risky sector, thereby reducing income inequality by a small amount, since the difference between B χ, w h (π * ) and w l (π * ) is still slight. The "insurance" effect, instead, applies to a large share of the population, and outweighs the "market size" effect, so that there is an increase in income inequality.
Therefore, improvements upon an already very good investor protection may in fact reduce inequality, although never below the case of no investor protection. Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 formalize this intuition.
Lemma 3
The variance of earnings is a non-monotonic function of investor protection:
dV ar(w) dp > 0 in a neighborhood of p = 0, and dV ar(w) dp < 0 in a neighborhood of p = 1.
Since, from Proposition 1, the size of the market for risk sharing (M) is continuous and monotonic in investor protection (p), also the relationship between the former and income inequality follows a non-monotonic pattern. the Gini exhibits a non-monotonic pattern, featuring a hump with its peak at a high M.
Panel B shows market size to be a function of investor protection, with the properties predicted by Proposition 1.
Empirical evidence
The model developed through sections 2 and 3 generates two main predictions: (1) Income inequality has a hump-shaped relationship with the size of the market for risk sharing, and (2) this market is bigger, the better is investor protection. Here, I empirically assess these results by applying a series of cross-section and panel data methodologies. The section is structured as follows: I Þrst present the data, then the econometric techniques, and Þnally report and comment on the results. GDP and its square to account for technology differences and the Kuznets hypothesis. I also control for government expenditure and trade as a share of GDP. These variables are taken from Heston and Summers' version 6.1 of the Penn World Tables. 17 I take two 1 5 The cross-section shrinks to 42 observations when I account for investor protection and efficiency of the judiciary in the regressions, since these variables are only available for 49 countries, some of which do not intersect with the wider dataset. I use the full panel dataset only for the static regressions. Since 18 countries have less than the three consecutive observations needed for the Arellano and Bover (1995) estimation, I perform the dynamic panel GMM on a restricted sample of 112 observations for 32 countries. 1 6 The original sample consists of 953 observations, which reduce to 418 separated by at least Þve years, on 137 countries over the period 1950-1999. Countries differ with respect to the survey coverage (national vs subnational), the welfare measure (income vs expenditure), the measure of income (net vs gross) and the unit of observation (households vs individuals). Data from Deininger and Squire are usually adjusted by adding 6.6 to the Gini coefficients based on expenditure. Here, the adjustment was made in a slightly more complicated way to account for the variety of sources; see Dollar and Kraay (2002) for details. 
Cross-section
To test the predictions of the model across countries, I estimate the following static equation:
where 
This strategy also allows me to evaluate the intermediate link between investor protection and the size of the risk-sharing market. I adopt two alternative sets of instruments, of overidentifying restrictions has a high p-value, excluding correlation between investor protection and the residuals e i , the data suggest that the whole mechanism suggested by the model is plausible: investor protection affects income inequality precisely through its effect on the risk-sharing market.
Fixed and random effects
To test the results of the paper both across countries and over time, I use the panel data methodology and estimate the following equation:
where G it is the average Gini coefficient observed in country i over a Þve-year period t, the terms in X it and smpr it are the same as for equation (4), and η t , ν t and T it are unobservable country-and time-speciÞc effects, and the error term, respectively. I estimate equation 
Dynamic Panel Data
As a further evaluation of the relationship between risk-sharing market size and inequality, I follow the latest approach of dynamic panel analysis, and focus on the expression:
where all variables are expressed in logarithms. Notice that the speciÞcation in equation 
and estimate the system of equations (6) and (7). The differences in the variables that are either endogenous or predetermined can be instrumented with their own lagged values, while lagged differences are instruments for levels. For instance, I use g it−3 as an instrument for ∆g it−1 and smpr it−2 for ∆smpr it , as well as ∆g it−2 and ∆smpr it−1 for Þcient, while the test statistics from the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will report coefficients and statistics from the Þrst and second step, respectively. Table 1 reports the Ordinary Least Squares estimates for different versions of equation (4). Moreover, the model predicts that inequality should never completely revert, even when the stock market achieves its maximum relative size; hence, it is reasonable to expect the linear term to be generally more signiÞcant, as is the case in Table 1 .
Results
Cross-sectional regressions
In However, the coefficients for sec 25 and gh_15 jointly estimated (column 6) suggest that the former is more signiÞcant. Given that sec 25 dominates gh_15, I will henceforth report the results obtained with sec 25 only. Finally, for the Kuznets hypothesis to hold, the estimated coefficients of GDP and (GDP ) 2 should be positive and negative, respectively.
The results in Table 1 do not allow me to validate this hypothesis, due to the lack of signiÞcance of both coefficients.
To get a quantitative ßavor of the implications of column 2 and 3, take pairs of countries , but a much less developed stock market (smpr was seven times smaller). Its predicted Gini (from the estimates in column 2) is lower than the Swiss by 6.8 vs the actual 7.1 points. 19 The results in Table 1 support the main prediction of the model on the relationship between size of the risk-sharing market and income inequality, but cannot provide evidence on the mechanism generating it, starting from investor protection. To see if investor protection affects income inequality independently from the risk-sharing market, I Þrst regress the Gini coefficient on the control variables in X and LLS's indicator of investor protection, and then add smpr. Table 2 shows that investor_pr has indeed a positive and signiÞcant effect on income inequality. However, the coefficients in columns 2 and 3 suggest that this effect is absorbed by stock market capitalization over total credit, once I control for it. Moreover, column 3 support the hypothesis that investor protection has no effect on inequality, unless paired by a bigger relative size of the stock market.
These results suggest that investor protection only affects income inequality through the development of the equity market relative to debt.
The instrumental variables estimates reported in Table 3 Table 4 and do not display major differences from Table 1 As shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 , the estimates for the linear term of stock market size remain positive and signiÞcant, while those for its square lose signiÞcance. Overall, the evidence from the sensitivity analysis favors strongly the existence of a positive γ 1 and, to a weaker extent, of a negative γ 2 .
Finally, the robustness of the results is tested in Table 5 , which reports the estimates of equation (5) where government expenditure and trade (as a ratio of GDP) are added as additional regressors. There are no major changes from Tables 1 and 3 , and the additional coefficients are not signiÞcantly different from zero.
Panel regressions
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 report the coefficients of equation (5) Table 6 . In conclusion, the static panel analysis suggests that stock market development plays as important a role as education in shaping income distribution.
The regression in Table 6 exploit the variation of inequality and market size across countries and through time. It cannot, though, account for the existence of dynamic feedbacks between inequality and stock market development. To overcome these methodological limitations, I adopt the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), and estimate various versions of system (6)- (7) . Table 7 reports the coefficients estimated with the two-step system GMM à la Arellano and Bover (1995). These results support again the existence of a signiÞcant positive linear relationship between the Gini's and the relative size of the stock market. The quadratic term is also signiÞcant and exhibits the expected negative sign. The estimates in column 3 imply that stock market development has signiÞcant effects on income inequality in the short run, while the dynamic analysis suggests that these effects persist also in long run, with coefficients γ 1 = .36 and γ 2 =-.212. The positive γ 1 remains signiÞcant after the inclusion of time, as well as time-continent effects. 21 All estimated coefficients for the lagged Gini's support the convergence hypothesis for income inequality, as in previous empirical work by Benabou (1996) , Lopez (2003) and Ravallion (2002) . As in the crosssectional and static panel regressions, the Kuznets' hypothesis Þnds no support and the predictive power of human capital becomes weaker.
When shifting from the static to the dynamic panel regressions, the countries with less than three consecutive observations are dropped from the sample. To make the results from the two panel techniques comparable, I replicate the Fixed and Random Effects estimates on the reduced sample and report the coefficients in columns 4-6 of Table 6 .
The coefficients for smpr and its square are positive and negative, respectively, and both signiÞcantly different from zero, as in the dynamic panel of Table7.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the equations in Tables 6 and 7 with government expenditure and trade over GDP as additional regressors, and report the results in Table 8 .
Both static and dynamic regressions support the prediction of a positive γ 1 and negative γ 2 . The estimates for government expenditure, which are non-signiÞcantly different from zero, reßect the ambiguity of theoretical predictions and previous empirical evidence.
Neither are the coefficients for trade openness signiÞcantly different from zero. 2 1 Results with time-continent effects are available upon request.
Summary
The estimates reported in this section suggest that the development of the market for risk sharing, proxied by the size of the stock market relative to private credit, tends to raise income inequality. The declining part of the hump predicted by the model is supported in a less robust way by the data. This evidence can be reconciled with the model, since the Gini coefficient is not expected to revert completely, even at very high levels of market development. Dynamic panel estimates show that the relationship between stock market development and income inequality continues to hold in the long run. Results from the cross-sectional regressions conÞrm the prediction that investor protection only affects income inequality through the development of the risk-sharing market.
Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical predictions and empirical support for a systematic relationship between investor protection, risk sharing and income inequality. I develop an overlapping generation model with risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their ability, where production can take place with a safe or a risky technology. In the presence of Þnancial frictions, arising from the non-observability of realizations and imperfect investor protection, I study the occupational and Þnancial choices for different ability groups. Better investor protection promotes risk sharing between entrepreneurs and Þnanciers and affects income inequality in a number of ways. First, it provides insiders with better insurance, thereby reducing income volatility for a given mass of risky entrepreneurs. Second, it raises the share of agents that choose the risky technology and are thereby exposed to earning risk. Finally, since ability affects risky payoffs, better investor protection also increases the overall reward to ability. The Þrst effect tends to reduce inequality, while the other two boost it. The main result of the paper is that income dispersion increases at Þrst with the size of the market for risk sharing, and then declines. In the empirical section, I provide evidence consistent with the predictions of the model.
A Proofs
Lemma 1
The assumptions that A > B and ϕA < B together with continuity of V i in π i imply the existence of a unique point π * ∈ (0, 1) where V * = Bχ−r. From this, it follows that for
and for π i = 0,
To prove that π * is a threshold, I just need to show that V i is increasing in π i . The derivative of V i w. r. t. π i under the optimal equity contract is
Lemma 2
To prove that the threshold ability is decreasing in investor protection, I obtain the derivative of π * with respect to p, dπ * dp = − dV dp
and show that it is negative. I have derived dV dπ * > 0 in the proof of Lemma 1. I just need to derive dV dp
Notice that dV dp > 0 for any π, since utility is concave. It follows that dπ * dp < 0. To prove that the threshold is convex in investor protection, I need to prove that d 2 π * (dp) 2 > 0.
All terms divided by dV dπ are positive, since the CRRA speciÞcation of the utility function implies that v 0 l > v 0 h and v 00 l < v 00 h , and dπ * dp ≤ 0. Therefore, d 2 π * (dp) 2 
Proposition 1
To prove the increasing monotonicity of the size of the risk-sharing market, and its concavity at high levels of investor protection, I derive dM dp = −g (π * ) dπ * dp d 2 M (dp) 2 = −g 0 (π * ) µ dπ * dp ¶ 2 − g (π * ) d 2 π * (dp) 2 .
From Lemma 1, dπ * dp ≤ 0, that implies dM dp ≥ 0; hence, the size of the market for risk sharing is increasing in investor protection. From Lemma 2, d 2 π * (dp) 2 > 0. Moreover, lim p→1 dπ * dp = lim p→1 ³ dV dp
It follows that M is concave in p in a neighborhood of p = 1, since lim (dp) 2 < 0.
Corollary 1
By optimality of factor employment in the Þnal good sector,
Risk-sharing Þnance as a ratio of total external Þnance is increasing in investor protection, d M F dp ≥ 0 for any p ∈ [0, 1], since dπ * dp ≤ 0 and the term in brackets is always positive. To prove concavity of M F in a neighborhood of p = 1, I derive
As lim p→1 dπ * dp = 0, while d 2 π * (dp) 2 > 0 at any p, lim p→1 d 2 M F (dp) 2 < 0.
Lemma 3
To prove non monotonicity, I differentiate V ar (w) with respect to p: dV ar (w) dp = dπ * dp
Notice that the term in the Þrst two lines represents the market size effect and is positive for all p, while the last line accounts for the risk sharing effect and is negative for all p.
For p → 0, π * → 1, E (w) → Bχ − r, w h → Aχ − r, w l → ϕAχ − r. Therefore, lim p→0 dV ar (w) dp = − dπ * dp g (1) (A − B) 2 χ 2 > 0.
¢ ϕ ¤ Aχ− r = Bχ − r, dπ * dp → 0. I study how dV ar(w) dp approaches zero in a left neighborhood of p = 1 by means of Taylor's Þrst-order approximation. Notice that d 2 V ar (w) (dp) 2 = " d 2 π * (dp) 2 g (π * ) + µ dπ * dp ¶ 2 g 0 (π * ) # n
It follows that, in a neighborhood to the left of p = 1, dV ar (w) dp
π (1 − π) g (π) dπ < 0.
Proposition 2
Recall from Proposition 1 that M is increasing in p. I characterize the relationship between the size of the risk-sharing market and the variance of earnings by studying dV ar (w) dM = dV ar (w) dp
¢¤ Aχ− r = Bχ − r, and dπ * dp → 0. It thus follows that lim p→1 dV ar (w) dM (p) = lim p→1 d dp
since v 00 < 0 for any CRRA utility function.
B Closed economy
In this section, I show how the economy can be closed without affecting the main results discussed in sections 2 and 3. Assume that capital and intermediate goods can no longer be imported or exported. It follows that their prices will be pinned down by domestic demand and supply: r t = α Yt K Y t , and χ t = (1 − α) Yt Xt . Further, capital will follow the law of motion:
where the RHS is aggregate savings. Aggregate capital is allocated between the Þnal and the intermediate good sectors:
The aggregate supply of intermediate goods, X t , equals total production of safe and risky projects:
Notice that the production of intermediate goods X t is decreasing in the threshold ability π * t . Optimal technology adoption maintains the threshold property of Lemma 1, since agents take prices as given and the risky payoffs are still increasing in ability. In any period, the threshold ability π * t satisÞes:
Equations (9) and (8) characterize the dynamic equilibrium. In the next sections, I report numerical solutions for the steady state and the transition dynamics. In particular, I
show that Lemmas 2-3 and Propositions 1-2 continue to hold in the steady state. Moreover, along the transition between steady states with different investor protection, the size of the risk-sharing market converges monotonically. Income inequality may instead converge along an oscillatory path, as a consequence of the dynamics of prices and capital.
B.1 The dynamics
The dynamics of the closed economy satisÞes equations (??) and (9):
Differently from the small open economy, equilibrium earnings w t (π i ) now depend also on factor prices, that are functions of the threshold ability (π * t ), and of the capital employed in the Þnal sector (K Y t = K t − 1). Given K t (which is predetermined), an increase in the hiding cost p raises the left-hand side of equation (9), which would determine a drop in the threshold ability π * . A lower threshold would in turn imply an increase in the production of intermediate goods (X t ) and in the demand of capital in the Þnal good sector (K Y t ), and therefore a drop in the price of intermediate goods (χ t ) and a rise in the interest rate (r t ). These changes in factor prices would feed back into equation (9), reducing both the left and the right-hand sides. In general equilibrium, the overall effect on the threshold depends on which side drops more. Notice however, that under perfect investor protection the threshold ability does not depend on relative factor prices, since π * p=1 = A−B Notice that, in the absence of investor protection, a minimum initial capital is required in order for production of the intermediate good, and hence of the Þnal good too, to be feasible: K 0 > 1 1−α (which makes sure that Bχ(π * = 1) > r(π * = 1)). Also, even in under perfect investor protection (p = 1), no young agent chooses the risky technology if capital is so scarce that the repayment due by an entrepreneur with ability 1 exceeds her cash
A (which makes sure that Aχ(π * = 1) > r(π * = 1)). Given that α = 0.33, at p = 1 there is a non-zero market for risk sharing, whenever capital satisÞes K > 1 1−α . Figure 4 describes the dynamics of an economy that starts with a very low capital endowment, K 0 = 0.5+ 1 1−α , and an intermediate degree of investor protection, p = 0.5. When K 0 is very low, the interest rate is so high relative to the price of the intermediate good that no young agent chooses the risky technology. Hence, the market for risk sharing is inactive and inequality is zero. As capital is accumulated, the interest rate falls and the price of intermediates rises. When the ratio r/χ becomes low enough, some young agents prefer the risky project and raise capital through the risk-sharing market. This implies that some income inequality arises due to the "market size" effect, as in the model of sections 2-3. The adjustment of capital and prices continues until the steady state is reached. Decreasing marginal productivity of capital guarantees the existence of the steady state.
Notice that the price of intermediate goods (χ) affects inequality also by changing the earnings differentials between safe and risky entrepreneurs. The higher χ, the wider the earnings differentials, the higher inequality ("price" effect). This implies that, with endogenous prices, inequality may vary even if stock market size does not. Figure 5 shows the adjustment after a policy change that increases investor protection from p = 0 to p = 0.05, starting from the steady state. Due to the convexity of π * t in p, the risky intermediate sector expands remarkably in response to the policy change. The marginal productivity of capital in the Þnal sector rises sharply because the production of intermediates increases. This causes an overshooting of the interest rate, that gradually declines with capital accumulation to its new (higher) steady state level. Inequality immediately jumps up and oscillates around its new (higher) steady state level until capital and prices are stable.
If the policy change occurs at high levels of investor protection, as shown in Þgure 6 for p from 0.85 to 0.9, the effect on productivity of factors (hence prices) is weaker. An increase in p induces a small increase in the size of the risky intermediate sector, and has virtually no effect on the interest rate. Inequality falls, since the "risk sharing" effect outweighs the "market size" effect at high levels of investor protection.
B.2 The steady state
In the steady state, K t+1 = K t = K and π * t+1 = π * t = π * . The equilibrium is the solution to the system:
In the presence of perfect investor protection, the threshold ability does not depend on factor prices and is equal to B−ϕA (1−ϕ)A as in the small open economy. Figure 7 plots the comparative statics for all levels of investor protection p ∈ [0, 1] in the steady state, which shows that Lemmas 1-3 and Propositions 1-2 continue to hold in the closed economy. In fact, the "price" effect, that affects inequality along the dynamics, is irrelevant in the steady state. Therefore, the comparative statics on investor protection is driven by the "market size" and "insurance" effects only, as in the small open economy. 
C Simulation details
The average years of schooling and their variance are then
with l 0 = lu, l 1 = lp, l 2 = ls and l 3 = lh. Group the countries in low-income, middle-income and high-income following the WDI criterion and take the average values of E (Q) and V (Q). Finally, µ and σ can be derived from the expressions for mean and variance of the Lognormal distribution:
3. DeÞne a grid of 101 degrees of investor protection p ∈ [0, 1], and a grid of initial guesses for the threshold ability π * ∈ £ π * p=1 , 1 ¤ , equally spaced by 0.0001 (the Þner the grid, the better the approximation).
4. Draw Π =10001 ability levels from a Lognormal (µ, σ) and sort them in ascending order. Identify the ability level π .9995 : G (π .9995 ) = 0.9995 and divide every π ≤ π .9995 by this Þgure. Replace all π > π .9995 by 1, so that the distribution is normalized to values included in [0, 1], and truncated in a way that makes the top 0.05 per cent of the population successful with certainty. Compute the Cdf of ability,
For every degree of investor protection p
(a) compute π * (p) as the solution to the technology choice problem. In particular,
recursively Þnd the point in the grid of π * satisfying:
(b) For every ability π i. draw the earning realization:
ii. sort w and derive its cumulative density function as F (w i ) = # of realizations w≤w i When simulating the closed economy, step 1 does not specify r.
Step 5.(a) Þnds the threshold ability π * t (p) which solves (10) for a given initial capital K t , taking into account that
After step 5.(c), capital in the next period is computed as K t+1 = P 1 i=0 w i − r and plugged into step 5.a. as new initial capital K t . This recursion goes on until the steady state is reached and K t = K t+1 . Table A Note: C and P stand for cross-sectional and panel datasets, respectively. L and S for large and small samples. Initial (1985) values of real per capita GDP and sec25 plus a dummy for Latin America are included. Coefficients in columns 1-2 and 5-6 are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. Coefficients in columns 3-4 are second step estimates from 2SLS regressions, with legal origins as instruments for smpr; first step estimates are not reported but available from the author. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. Coefficients in columns 3-4 are second step estimates from 2SLS regressions, with legal origins as instruments for smpr; first step estimates are not reported but available from the author. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. The dependent variables is the Gini coefficient. Real per capita GDP, and education (sec25) are in initial values, financial variables (smpr, smcap and privo) are in sample averages over non-overlapping 5-year periods. All equations were estimated with random (RE) and fixed effects (FE). The coefficients are reported from the specification chosen based on the Hausman tests, whose p-values are reported in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. The dependent variables in the system are the log and the log-difference of the Gini coefficient. All regressors are in log and log-differences. Real per capita GDP, and education (sec25) are in initial values, financial variables (smpr, smcap and privo) are in sample averages over non-overlapping 5-year periods. Coefficients are first step estimates from 2-step system GMM regressions à la Arellano and Bover, performed with PcGive. All regressors are treated as endogenous (Gini) or predetermined, hence instrumented. Lagged levels are used as instruments for differences, and lagged differences as instruments for levels. Robust (first step) standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. P-values for the Sargan and m2 tests are reported from the second step. The dependent variable is the 5-year average Gini coefficient. Real per capita GDP and sec25 are in initial values, smpr, government expenditure (gov) and trade over GDP are in 5-year averages. All regressions include a dummy for Latin American countries. All variables are in levels in columns 1-2, in logs and log-differences in columns 3-6. Coefficients in columns 1-2 are estimated with random effects (preferred to fixed effects on the basis of the Hausman test). Coefficients in columns 3-4 are first step estimates from 2-step system GMM regressions à la Arellano and Bover, performed with PcGive. All regressors are treated as endogenous (Gini) or predetermined, hence instrumented. Lagged levels are used as instruments for differences and lagged differences as instruments for levels. Robust standard errors (from the first step, in columns 3-6) are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. P-values for the Sargan and m 2 tests are reported from the second step.
